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SUMMARY 
Picketing, a method used by employees, collectively, to assert their demands against 
employers, is a controversial subject arising from the conflict of interest existing between 
labour and employers! 
Previously, South African law neither forbade nor regulated picketing. Consequently, 
no immunity from civil liability existed in relation to a person's conduct during a picket. 
Presently, picketing is regulated by section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act 108of19% (right to picket) and section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995, which provides for a protected picket (one that complies with the 
requirements of section 69) whereby immunity from civil liability attaches to a person's 
conduct during a picket. These provisions and their coexistence is examined, comparing 
foreign law where relevant, in an attempt to provide a foundation for a topic relatively 
disregarded. Section 69 reveals elements of uncertainty and vagueness. 
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PICKETING IN TERMS OF THE 
LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Picketing has always been a controversial subject by its nature, predominantly due 
to the fact that there has always been a conflict of interest between organised 
labour and employers1. Employers seek the ultimate advantage of profit gain, 
whereas, employees/workers seek a decent wage to enable them to survive. This 
controversy is further exacerbated by the fact that the conduct of persons taking 
part in the picket will inevitably constitute a breach of some law or other 
(common law, statute or criminal law). Contrary to this, it is generally accepted 
that employees have the option of asserting their demands against the employer 
by collectively standing together. Collective action can take a variety of forms 
such as strike action and picketing2. As such, the law seeks to balance the 
conflicting interests of employers and workers3. The law does this in South 
Africa, presently, and in the context of picketing, by the operation of section 69 of 
the Labour Relations Act 66of1995, which provides for a right to picket 
peacefully. Section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 takes into account 
the interests of employers and employees by allowing for a picket in defined 
circumstances. An analysis of section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
will form the basis of this dissertation. 
1 Paul Davies, Mark Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3I<1 Edition 1983 London Stevens & 
Sons at page 65, 66,67; Peggy Kahn, Norman Lewis, Rowland Livock & Paul Wiles Picketing 1983 
Routledge & Kegan Paul plc at page 53. 
2 James W Hunt Patricia K Strongin The Law of the Workplace 3I<I Edition 1994 BNA Books at page 193; 
Peggy Kahn, Norman Lewis, Rowland Livock & Paul Wiles Picketing 1983 Routledge & Kegan Paul plc 
at page 57; see chapter IV of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 and section 23 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
3 Paul Davies, Mark Freedland Kahn-Freund 's Labour and the Law 3rd Edition 1983 London Stevens & 
Sons at page 65, 66. 
2. THE DEFINITION OF A PICKET 
Ordinarily a picket is not a term capable of exhaustive and exact definition. The 
dictionary 4 defines a picket as : 
"one or more persons stationed by strikers outside place of work to dissuade 
others from entering"5. 
A local author6 defines a picket as action involving : 
"some form of gathering or congregation of employees who would see their 
primary task as :-
1. Communicating information about the strike to the unaware; 
2. To persuade non-strikers to join the strike; and 
3. To prevent, by moral pressure or physical obstruction, scabs from 
operating the plant". 
The Labour Relations Code of British Columbia7 authoritatively defines a picket 
as : 
"attending at or near a person's place of business, operations or employment for 
the purpose of persuading or attempting to persuade anyone not to 
(a) enter that place of business, operations or employment, 
(b) deal in or handle that person's products, or 
( c) do business with that person, 
and a similar act at such a place that has an equivalent purpose". 
A Canadian labour text8 defines picketing as having 3 basic elements namely, (I) 
the presence of one or more persons, (2) communication by spoken or written 
messages, or through behaviour, and (3) an intention by presence or 
4 The Pocki/t Oxford Dictionary 7th Edition, Oxford University Press. 
5 The Pocket Oiford Dictionary 7th Edition, Oxford University Press also gives the word "picket" a military 
connotation by defining it as "small body of troops acting as patrol". 
6 Professor D Davis "Picketing" (1988) Vol. 9 No. I Industrial Law Journal at page 26. 
7 Section l (1) of the Labour Relations Code S.B.C. 1992, c.82. 
8 ProfH W Arthurs ProfD D Carter Prof J Fadge ProfH J Glasbeeck Labor Law and Industrial Relations 
in Canada 4th Edition 1993 Butterworths Kluwer at paragraphs 651-652 on page 273. 
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communication to secure a sympathetic response from third persons, e.g. 
customers who will cease to deal with a struck employer, prospective employees 
who will decline to accept employment in a struck enterprise, or suppliers who 
will interrupt shipments of materials required to sustain production in a struck 
plant. 
An American labour text9 refers to a picket as : 
"an attempt by workers or a union to elicit the support for their positions by 
advertising their side of the dispute to other workers and to the public". 
The English law10 gives protection to pickets for the purpose of: 
"peacefully obtaining or communicating information or peacefully persuading 
any person to work or abstain from working". 
What is apparent from these definitions is the element of persuasion to achieve a 
tactical objective of preventing other workers and suppliers of the employer from 
dealing with the employer11 . Beyond such objectives lie further underlying 
objectives such as getting the employer to accede to demands which form the 
subject of strike action12. In general, and having regard to the definitions above, 
one understands picketing to occur where striking workers station themselves at 
or near their employer's place of employment in an effort to persuade other 
parties such as non-strikers, customers and suppliers of the employer not to work 
and not to do business with the employer. 
9 James WHunt Patricia K Strongin The Law of the Workplace 3rd Edition 1994 BNA Books at page 193, 
194. 
10 Gwyneth Pitt Employment Law 2nd Edition 1995 Sweet & Maxwell at page 344; section 220 read with 
section 219 of the British Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992. 
11 Peggy Kahn, Nonnan Lewis, Rowland Livock & Paul Wiles Picketing 1983 Routledge & Kegan Paul pie 
at page 57, 58. 
12 Benjamin Albertyn Jacobus Strikes, Lock-outs and Arbitration in South African Labour Law 1989 Juta & 
Co at page 55. 
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3. PICKETING AT COMMON LAW 
Picketing was never forbidden by South African law except that one who 
participated in a picket exposed himself to civil liability in that his conduct during 
the picket could amount to a delict (e.g. defamatory statements made during the 
course of a picket), or his actions could constitute a breach of contract in that by 
taking part in a picket one is failing to perform one's obligation to work in terms 
of a contract of employment. A breach of contract in these circumstances could 
give rise to the employee's dismissal. Such dismissal could naturally be attacked 
as being unfair. One's conduct during a picket could also potentially form the 
basis of an interdict. 
The question arises whether there was any immunity or protection against civil 
liability prior to the coming in of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. No 
express protection was afforded in law or in terms of the Labour Relations Act 28 
of 1956. However, section 79 of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 provides 
that no civil proceedings may be brought in any court of law against any 
employee, any employer, registered trade union or employers organisation or 
against any member, office bearer, or official of such a union or organisation, in 
respect of any breach of contract, breach of statutory duty or deli ct (except 
defamation) committed by the employee, employer, union or organisation or by 
that member, office bearer, official or organisation, in furtherance of a strike or 
lock-out. Although, this section predominantly is a provision aimed at strikes, it 
could be argued that a picket is conduct in furtherance of a strike or lock-out and 
as such is protected in terms of this provision. The protection envisaged by this 
section fell away if the act causing damage constituted a criminal offence or if the 
requirements for a lawful strike under section 65 of Labour Relations Act 28 of 
1956 were not complied with13. 
13 Section 79 of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
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South Africa had many criminal provisions which made picketing a precarious 
activity. These criminal laws had a negative affect on picketing and according to 
Benjamin14 disturbed the balance of bargaining power in favour of employers. 
The Internal Security Act 74of1982, the Trespass Act 6of1959 and the 
Intimidation Act 72 of I 982 and other by-laws regulating traffic flows and 
obstruction of pavements were applied15 . An academic writer16 makes the point 
that the criminal regulation oflndustrial Relations should be dispensed with as it 
has no deterrent affect on strike action. In support of this view he states that 
strike action has increased significantly and that most of these strikes were illegal. 
He states further that there was a reluctance to prosecute and this had the effect of 
bringing the law into disrepute even though this reluctance was politically and 
socially justified. 
In view of the fact that a lot of strike action in our past history was illegal 17 and, at 
least, some conduct during a picket would amount to criminal conduct it seems 
that the protection afforded by section 79 of Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, if 
accepted to be applicable, would have been ineffective. The new Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 expressly recognises the right to picket and affords 
participants protection against civil liability18. The protection afforded against 
civil liability also does not extend to criminal offences19. Consequently, one may 
ask how effective the protection afforded against civil liability will be under the 
new Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 ! In this regard, one is referred to the 
discussion of how certain laws are not deemed to be criminal offences for the 
purposes of determining civil liability under the new Labour Relations Act 66 of 
199520. One is referred further to discussion of the terms "despite any law 
14 Benjamin Albertyn Jacobus Strikes, Lock-outs and Arbitration in South African Labour Law 1989 Juta & 
Co at page 54. 
15Professor D Davis "Picketing" (1988) Vol. 9 No. l Industrial Law Journal at page 33-36. 
16 M Brassey E Cameron H Cheadle M Olivier The New Labour Law 1987 Juta at page 252. 
17 M Brassey E Cameron H Cheadle M Olivier The New Labour Law 1987 Juta at page 252. 
18 Section 69 (7) read with section 67ofthe Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
19 Section 69 (7) read with section 67 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
20 Section 69 (7) read with section 67 (9) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995; see the discussion hereof 
under the heading "The legal protection afforded under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995" at page 26 of 
this dissertation. 
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regulating the right of assembly" later on in this dissertation under the heading 
"The place where a picket is staged"21 . 
4. PICKETING IN TERMS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
The South African Constitution (hereafter called the Constitution)22 has 
introduced the concept of a Bill of Rights into South Africa23 . The Bill of Rights, 
in terms of section 17, gives everyone the right to picket peacefully and unarmed. 
It is clear from section 8 (I) and section 7 (2) of the Constitution that the Bill of 
Rights is applicable to the relationship between the organs of state and the 
individual (natural and juristic persons)- the so called vertical application - the 
decision in Du Plessis vs De Kler"J?-4 emphasizes this. The justification for the so 
called vertical application of the Constitution was based on various reasons 
including, but not limited to, the interpretation of the Constitution itself5 as well 
as to the possible total negation of customary law.26 The rights in the Bill are not 
applicable to the relationship between private litigants - the so-called horizontal 
application27. However, section 39 (2) of the Constitution provides for the courts 
to interpret legislation and develop the common law and customary law in order 
to promote the spirit, purport, and the objects of the Bill of Rights. In the Du 
Plessis case28, the corresponding provision was section 35 (3) of the 1993 
Constitution29 . The court held that section 35 (3) of the Constitution of the 
21 See the discussion of section 69 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 at page 17 of this 
dissertation. 
22 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
23 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
24 Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at page 854 E-G; the decision in the aforementioned case 
concerned the application of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. It is 
submitted that the decision is applicable to the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996 in that the provisions of the new Constitution are in principle based on the old Constitution and the 
reasons advanced by the court in Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) in favour of the vertical 
application of the Constitution do find application to the new Constitution for e.g. see Sachs rs Judgement 
at page 935 B-E. 
25 See Generally Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at page 871 C, 854 B-E and Kentridge A 
J's Judgement at page 876-878. 
26 See Du Plessis vs De Klerk l 996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at page 935 B~E as per Sachs J's Judgement. 
27 See Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at page 854 E-G. 
28 See Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). 
29 Section 35 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 provides for , 
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Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, introduced an indirect application of 
the fundamental rights to private law30. The court held that the courts should not 
invalidate rules of common law inconsistent with the Chapter 3 rights or declare 
them unconstitutional, instead the development of common law must be pursued 
by the courts in the normal course as opposed to the Constitutional Court's 
powers under section 98 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
200 of 1993 31 . It is submitted that legislation has to be applied and interpreted 
according to the object of the Bill of Rights, to the extent that the provision 
permits32. 
It must be emphasized that the rights comprising the Bill of Rights can be limited 
by the operation of section 36 of the Constitution (the limitations clause). 
Therefore, the question arises, with reference to the relationship between private 
litigants, whether the Courts should interpret legislation and develop the common 
law and customary law taking into account the possible limitations on the rights 
expressed in the Bill of Rights. It is submitted that this is the case for the reason 
that any other interpretation would be developing legislation and the common law 
in accordance with absolute rights. This is not in accordance with section 7 (3) of 
the Constitution. Section 8 (2), (3) and (4) of the Constitution confirm this. It 
must be remembered that the decision in Du Plessis vs De Klerk provided that · 
where a court makes a decision on the development of common law then such 
decision subject to appeal in the normal way33. Only once the normal appeal 
stages have been exhausted does the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to 
determine whether the development or interpretation is in accordance with the 
objects and purport of the Bill ofRights34. 
"In the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law and 
customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this chapter". 
Section 3 9 (2~ of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 has virtually the same 
wording. 
30 Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at page 854 F-I, 885 E-H. 
31 Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at page 854 F-I, 855 A-C, 887 E-G. 
32 Such as the Labour Relations Act 66of1995; also see section 3(a) and 3(b) of the aforementioned Act. 
33 Du Plessis vs De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at page 855 A-C. 
34 See section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 ofl996. 
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Section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is a limitation on the right to 
picket in terms of section 17 of the Constitution and possibly the equality clause 
in section 9 of the Constitution. The question arises whether section 69 of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is a justifiable limitation in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution, bearing in mind the vertical and horizontal application of the 
Constitution. The extent to which the provisions of section 69 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 infringe on the rights as protected by the Constitution 
and the extent to which this is justified will be explored under the various 
headings explaining and detailing the right to picket under section 69 of Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
A phenomenon has arisen in the United States of America35 and Canada36 to 
protect the right to picket under the right to freedom of expression. Because the 
right to picket is expressly provided for in terms of section 17 of the Constitution 
it seem certain that the right to picket will probably be regulated as one relating to 
assembly rather than expression. 
5. PICKETING AND THE NEW LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
5.1 The circumstances in which a picket is allowed. 
35 American law sees picketing as falling within the area of free discussion as provided for in the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution - see in general David P Twomey Labor and 
Employment Law 9t11 Edition 1994 South Western Publishing Co at page 209; see further the Thornhill vs 
The State of Alabama 310 US 88,6 LRRM 697 (1940) as reproduced in David P Twomey Labor and 
Employment Law 9th Edition 1994 South Western Publishing Co at pages 209-213 (especially page 212); 
because the right to picket peacefully was equated with freedom of speech it was protected from 
abridgement by the State under the Fourteenth Amendment - for a general discussion of how the right to 
picket peacefully was extended to something more than free ~h and how it became subject to State 
regulation see Patrick Hardin The Developing Labour Law 3 Edition Vol. 2 1995 BNA Books at pages 
1090-1091. 
36 Picketing is protected as a right to freedom of expression as it has a 'communicative' element to it. 
Expression has been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada (Irwin Toy vs Quebec (1989) 1 S.C.R. 927 
at 968) as "activity is expressive if it attempts to convey meaning" - see Hogg Constitutional Law of 
Canada 3rd Edition 1992 Carswell at page 963; Hogg at page 990 also sees picketing as being protected 
under the right to assembly in terms of section 2( c) of the Canadian Constitution. 
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A picket can only be held in support of a protected strike or a lock-out (protected 
or unprotected}37. Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 gives the 
definition of a strike or lock-out. However, nothing is mentioned as to whether 
the strike or lock-out is protected or not. One can deduce from Chapter IV of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 read with section 67 ( 1) of the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 that a protected strike and protected lock-out is one that complies 
with the provisions of Chapter IV of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. This 
in essence, without going into a detailed analysis of the laws relating to protected 
strikes, means that a protected strike is one that complies with the provisions of 
Chapter IV of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
A striking feature of section 69 ( 1) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is 
the fact that it only provides for a picket in relation to protected strikes. One will 
see from a short reading of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 that section 67 
gives certain protection to strikers from civil liability provided the strike is 
protected. As such the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 promotes protected 
strikes and discourages strikes not in conformity with the Act (unprocedural 
strike). The provisions in Chapter IV dealing with conciliation38 before a strike is 
allowed to take place, seek to settle disputes and to avoid strike action. Therefore 
one can contend that strike action must be resorted to as a last resort. Failure to 
comply with these requirements of Chapter IV simply ignores the objects of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The right to picket is afforded to protected 
strikes only to encourage compliance with the provisions of Chapter IV which in 
turn will encourage compliance with the objects of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995, which is to minimize strike action39. 
37 Section 69 (l)(a) and (b) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
38 Section 64 (1) Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
39 See the explanatory memorandum of the Draft Labour Relations Bill of 1995 published in the 
Government Gazette under Notice No. 97of1995 at page 128, 129; see :further section 1 (d) (iv) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66of1995; see the article by Bonile Ngqiyaza, "CCMA helps to cut number of 
strikes" in the Business Day dated 30/09/1997. 
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One will notice that the right to picket in terms of section 69 ( l) (b) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66of1995 is given to any lock-out and not just a protected lock-
out. The reason is that there is no moral or justifiable argument preventing 
picketing an employer who has failed to undertake a protected lock-out40 . Support 
can be found in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 itself for this proposition in 
that employees of an employer can go on strike in response to an unprotected 
lock-out of the employer without having to follow the procedural requirements of 
section 64 ( l) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 which are required for a 
protected strike41 . 
As the right to picket is provided for only in relation to protected strikes, it is 
necessary to determine the time at which a protected strike comes into being. 
The definition of a strike by its nature requires that there must be a concerted 
refusal to work or a retardation or obstruction of work 42. The strike is made 
protected if it complies with the requirements of section 64 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66of1995, therefore, one can say that a protected strike only comes 
into being once the requirements of Chapter IV of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 have been complied with and there has been a concerted refusal to work, or 
a retardation or obstruction of work. It is submitted that this must occur before a 
picket can be staged in terms of section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995. 
As the right to picket is provided for with regard to any lock-out, it is necessary to 
determine the time at which a lock-out comes into being. A lock-out requires 
exclusion by the employer of the employees from the employer's work-place 43 . 
A lock-out is not qualified as protected or unprotected in terms of section 69 of 
the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. However, ifthe employer engages in a 
protected lock-out, then the procedural requirements of Chapter IV of the Labour 
40 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (1%6) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law at page 42. 
41 Section 64 (3)(c) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
42 Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
43 Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
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Relations Act 66 of 1995 must also be complied with before the picket in terms of 
section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 can occur. If a lock-out is 
unprotected then the picket can be staged directly after the act of exclusion. 
5.2 The employer who is affected by a picket 
The employer who is affected by the picket is not defined in section 69 of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is so 
broad and does not qualify the word "employer''. Such an unlimited word is 
unworkable and is in need of delimitation. Usually in the context oflndustrial 
Relations and a strike, the employees of an employer alongside the union try to 
reinforce strike action against their own employer by staging a picket. However, 
the concept of a secondary picket44 has developed whereby, a supplier of an 
employer hit by a strike (struck employer) is picketed so that he will sever his 
business ties with the struck employer. It is submitted that secondary picketing is 
permitted in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 as section 69 (2)(a) of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 refers to "an employer'' with no qualification 
as to whether the employer is the employer affected by the strike or the lock-out. 
This in turn has economic repercussions for independent and innocent third 
parties who do business with a struck employer for example, a third party, being a 
supplier of affected employer, who succumbs to picketers demands and severs his 
contractual relationship with the affected employer. In principle the affected 
employer has a claim against the picketers for the interference of his contractual 
relationship ifhe does not receive his performance or if his obligations are 
increased45 . It is further submitted that the term employer is limited by the 
definition 46 of picket within the context of Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 so 
that at most the struck employer and his suppliers are employers within the 
meaning of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
44 David P Twomey Labor and Employment Law 9th Edition 1994 South Western Publishing Co at page 
209. 
45 Neethling Potgieter Visser The Law of Delict 2"'1Edition1992 Butterworths at page 256-259. 
46 Refer to the heading "The definition of a picket" at page 2 of this dissertation. 
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5.3 Persons who may stage a picket 
Section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 sees the right to picket as a 
collective right and not as an individual right as the right to picket is conferred on 
registered trade unions only - section 69 ( 1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 requires that such trade unions may "authorise" a picket. A registered trade 
union is a trade union registered in terms of the provisions of Chapter VI of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The right to picket, if authorised by a 
registered union, will be conducted by members of the union and its supporters. 
As such the persons capable of conducting the picket are numerous in number. 
This has a number of consequences. Persons who are not employed by the 
employer can be part of the picket. This definition gives credence to the view of 
mass picketing. Because the right to picket in terms of section 69 (1) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is conferred on registered trade unions only, 
constitutional problems arise. Where the Constitution has vertical application47, 
employees of the state can in principle rely on the infringement of their 
constitutional right to equality in terms of section 9 of the Constitution. Section 9 
of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. Unregistered trade unions having state employees as members 
can likewise do the same. There is also the possibility that the right to picket in 
terms of section 17 of the Constitution is violated by section 69 (I) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 in that the individuals right to picket is subjected to the 
limitation of prior authorisation by a registered union. However, the effect of 
section 36 of the Constitution will have to be seen. Where the Constitution has 
horizontal application the same principles apply except that the courts will have to 
interpret section 69 (I) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 in accordance with 
the spirit, objects and purport of the Constitution48. 
The question arises whether there is any justification, in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, for conferring the right to picket on registered trade unions only. 
47 See the discussion under the heading '"Picketing in terms of the South African Constitution" at page 6 of 
this dissertation. 
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Justification exists in that trade unions play such a necessary and important 
function in collective bargaining49. This requires some form of regulation e.g. 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 requires that trade unions have to comply 
with certain equality provisions in their constitutions before registration is 
allowed50. By allowing only registered unions the right to picket then unions 
with discriminatory constitutions have no choice but to register in terms of the 
provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 to acquire such a right. This 
could possibly justify the distinction between registered and unregistered unions. 
However, it does not explain why the right to picket is not given directly to 
employees. Perhaps, guidance can be obtained in this regard from the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 itself, albeit in terms of other provisions. In terms of 
the strike provision in Chapter IV51 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995, the 
right to strike is afforded to employees. As picketing is an ancillary activity in 
relation to a strike (in support of the strike), then it seems uncertain why 
employees get the right to strike and registered trade unions get the right to picket. 
The British Columbia Code52 confers the right to picket on a trade union, a 
member or members who are lawfully on strike. English law allows "a person" 
to picket53. "A person" is delimited to the extent that it is an employee of the 
employer54 or a union official of a trade union55 . American law allows for 
employees to picket56. American and Canadian law are of some use in this regard 
because of the commonality of a Bill of Rights. 
48 Section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. 
49 Section 1( c) and 1 ( d) of the Labour Relation Act 66 of 1995. 
50 Section 95 (6) of the Labour Relation Act 66of1995. 
51 Section64 of the Labour Relation Act 66of1995. 
52 Section 65 (3) of the Labour Relations Code S.B.C. 1992, c.82 of British Columbia; The Code as 
aforesaid was chosen as a point of reference because British Columbia is the only Province in Canada 
which specifically regulates picketing in a statute - the other Provinces simply rely on ordinary common 
law principles - see Prof. H W Arthurs Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Canada 4th Edition 1993 
Kluwer Butterworths at page 274, 275 at paragraph 655. 
53 Section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992. 
54 Section 220 (1 )(a) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992. 
55 Section 220 (l)(b) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992. 
56 James W Hunt Patricia K Strongin The Law of the Workplace 3rd Edition 1994 BNA Books at page 194. 
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5.4 The place where a picket is staged 
Section 69 (2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 confers the right to 
strike at any place to which the public has access but outside the premises of the 
employer. "Premises" is not defined in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
Logical reasoning indicates that the word "premises" means the place where the 
employer carries on his business operations. Where major corporations are 
concerned and the corporation is divided up into several branches and divisions 
the possibility exists that the place of each branch or division means the 
"premises" of the employer. As stated previously, section 69 (1) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides through the term "supporters" for the fact that 
the picketers do not have to be the employees of the picketed employer. Section 
69 (2) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 refers to "an employer'', hence 
the term employer is not qualified57. Consequently, as long as the picket is in 
support of a protected strike or any lock-out, it does not matter which employer is 
hit by the picket. This seems very broad however, one must remember that the 
picket is limited by its definition58. From the aforesaid, it is tenable then to 
consider that as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 impliedly authorises 
secondary picketing then there is no reason why any branch or division of a 
company cannot be picketed as being the "premises" of the employer. Afterall, 
the effect of a picket is to prevent suppliers and customers from dealing with the 
company59. 
A further point indicating that premises includes all the branches and divisions of 
a company is section 69 (5)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. Section 
69 (S)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 requires that the Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (hereafter called the CCMA) must decide 
on rules regulating the conduct of the picket if the parties cannot agree thereto. 
In so doing, the commission is required to take into account the personal 
57 Refer to the heading "The employer who is affected by a pickef' at page 11 of this dissertation. 
58 Refer to the heading "The Definition of a Picket" at page 2 of this dissertation. 
59 Refer to the heading "The Definition of a Picket" at page 2 of this dissertation. 
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circumstances of the "work-place" or other "premises"60. Work-place is defined 
in section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Paragraph c61 under the 
definition of"work-place" defines the "work-place" to mean "in all other 
instances, the place or places where employees work". This means the 
geographical place where the employees actually work or it could mean all the 
places where the employees of the employer work. However, paragraph c 
clarifies this by stating that if the employer carries on or conducts two or more 
operations which are independent of one another by reason of their size, function 
or organisation then the place of the separate operation is deemed to be the "work-
place". From the aforesaid, it is easy to see how difficult this definition is to 
interpret. Therefore, I submit that the reason why the legislator included the 
word "premises" after "work-place" in section 69 (S)(a) of the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 is to make it clear that "premises" applies to a wider definition 
than just where the employee actually works. 
An inquiry into how other juri~dictions deal with the place where the picket is to 
be held could possibly prove useful. In the Canadian province of British 
Columbia the right to picket is expressly set out in terms of section 65 (7) of the 
Labour Relations Code62 which provides that specific divisions or other parts of a 
corporation or firm, if they are separate and distinct operations, are treated as 
separate employers. Section 3 of the Labour Relations Code63 limits the place 
where the picket is to be held at or near a site or place where a member of the 
trade union performs work under the control and direction of the employer. The 
English law64 provides for the picket to be held "at or near his own place of 
work". Picketing is limited to the actual place where the employee works for the 
employer. Unfortunately, these examples cannot be of any use in determining the 
meaning of "premises" as Canadian law and British law do not set out secondary 
picketing and the picket only applies to employees, trade unions and its members 
60 Section 69 (5)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
61 Section213 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
62 Labour Relations Code S.B.C. 1992, c.82 of British Columbia. 
63 Labour Relations Code S.B.C. 1992, c.82 of British Columbia. 
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and not to its supporters as provided in section 69 ( 1) of the Labour Relations Act 
66 ofl995. 
What is the situation if the employer is situated fn a Mall with several other 
employers who are in no way connected with his business? If one looks at the 
provision in section 69 (2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 one sees that 
the provision refers to, "any place to which the public has access". As such, a 
Mall could be the stage where the production of the picket unfolds. Canada has 
solved this problem by the enactment of various statutes such as the Code of 
British Columbia which provides that "no action or proceeding may be brought 
for petty trespass to any land to which a member of the public ordinarily has 
access"
65
. American law has also given support to this view66 by holding that 
picketing was Constitutionally protected in a shopping center because the 
shopping center served as the community business block and was freely 
accessible and open to people in the area and those who were passing through67. 
However, American law has conflicting decisions regarding this point68. 
Section 69 (2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 envisages that a picket 
can take place in "any place to which the public has access". Access is not 
defined nor qualified - does this mean that persons may stage a picket in a prison 
for example? It should be pointed out that although this provision is in 
accordance with the right to picket in terms of section 17 of the Constitution, 
however, it does not provide for any limitation. In America, peaceful assembly, 
64 Section 220 (l)(a) and (b) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992. 
65 Section 66 (a) of the Labour Relations Code S.B.C. 1992, c.82 of British Columbia; for more references 
see Professor Arthurs Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Canada 4th Edition 1993 Kluwer 
Butterworths at paragraph 705 page 290. 
66Food Employees Local 590 vs Logan Valley Plaza 391 US 308,68 LRRM 2209 (1968). 
67Food Employees Local 590vs Logan Valley Plaza 391US308,68 LRRM 2209 (1968) atpage 2213; see 
the discussion of the Logan Valley case in Patrick Hardin The Developing Labour Law 3rd Edition Vol. 2 
page 1091. 
68 Food Employees Local 590 vs Logan Valley Plaza 391 US 308,68 LRRM 2209 (1968) and Hudgens vs 
NLRB 424 US 507,91 LRRM 2489 (1976); see Patrick Hardin The Developing Labour Law 3rd Edition Vol 
2 pages 1092 and 109J- where he gives a good summa.cy of how the decision in the Logan Valley Case was 
overruled by the Sµpreme Court of America in the Hudgens Case where it was stated that their was no First 
Amendment right to picket or to contact the public inside a privately owned shopping centre or mall. 
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which is protected in terms of the First Amendment does not mean that a picket 
can be held on all property to which the public has access69. I submit that the 
term "access" should be restrictively interpreted in line with the limitations as 
envisaged in section 36 of the Constitution. Afterall, the courts have the function 
of developing and interpreting statutes in accordance with the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution70. 
The phrase "despite any law regulating the right of assembly" appears in terms of 
section 69 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. What is the effect of these 
words? Does it imply that a peaceful picket can be held in conflict with 
municipal by-laws and criminal provisions prohibiting the assembly of people! 
A literal interpretation of this implies that picketing in contravention of these 
provisions can be undertaken. However, it is submitted that the picket must be 
conducted in accordance with other laws and that the aforementioned phrase does 
not give the picketers a licence to do what they desire. If the law in question is of 
doubtful constitutional validity, the picket could be proceeded with but, the parties 
could be subjected to criminal prosecution. If a prosecution is proceeded with, 
the law could be attacked as an infringement of the right to assembly 71 on the 
basis that the state is a party to the litigation (vertical application)72. If this is the 
case, then what is the need for the phrase? A possible explanation for this is the 
fact that section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 should be seen as a 
measure protecting picketers from the consequences of civil liability. Section 69 
(7) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 67 (8) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides that a picketer will not receive the protection 
against civil liability if the act in contemplation or furtherance of a picket is an 
offence. Section 67 (9) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 provides 
expressly that an act in furtherance or contemplation of a picket which 
69 See Jayson Kraut American Jurisprudence 200 Edition Vol. 16A 1979 The Lawyers Co-<>perative 
Publishing Co generally at pages 425, 426 and pages 402, 403, 404, 405 (where it relates to freedom of 
speech and expression). 
70 Section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
71 Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. 
72 Section 8 (I) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act I 08 of 1996. 
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contravenes the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3of1983 or the Wage Act 
5of1957 does not constitute an offence for the purposes of civil liability. 
Section 67 (9) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 does not imply that an 
infringement of the Basic Conditions ofEmploymertt Act or Wage Act will take 
away the criminal liability attached to it but only that it will not be deemed a 
criminal offence when deciding if someone is liable on a civil basis. It is 
submitted that the phrase 73 should be seen as a provision deeming contraventions 
of other criminal provisions not criminal offences for the purposes of determining 
civil liability. This can be explained with reference to the effect that the Internal 
Security Act 74of198274 had on gatherings. This interpretation is in accordance 
with the Constitution where the rights as entrenched in the Bill of Rights are not 
seen as absolute but capable of limitations 75 . With this interpretation the right to 
picket in terms of section 17 of the Constitution is not seen as an inviolate 
absolute right. English law76 states that a person who commits a criminal offence 
during a picket is still liable to prosecution. This even more so in view of the fact 
that section 219 (3) read with section 220 of the British Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992 only protects a picketer from civil liability. 
The British Columbia Code77 protects picketers from certain forms of civil 
liability. It does not protect them from criminal liability. 
5.5 The manner in which a picket is conducted 
Section 69 ( 1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 requires the picket to be 
peaceful. As such, it is in conformity with the Constitution which provides in 
terms of section 17 for the right to peaceful assembly and picketing. The 
element of peacefulness is prevalent in most countries relating to the right of 
73 
"Despite any law regulating the right of assembly" in section 69 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995. 
74 See Professor Davis "Picketing" Vol. 9 No. 1 Industrial Law Journal (1988) at page 34. 
75 Section 36 and section 7 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. 
76 Section C paragraph 41 of the Code of Practice .... Picketing (1992) as created and regulated by the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992 in terms of sections 199 to 208; see further 
section 219(3) read with section 220 of theTrade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992. 
77 Section 66 of the Labour Relations Code S.B.C. 1992, c.82 of British Columbia. 
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assembly. The United States First Amendment provides for the right to assembly 
peaceably78. The Canadian Constitution79 through its charter of rights provides in 
section 2 (c) for the freedom of peaceful assembly. The German Constitution80 in 
terms of Article 8 (!)provides for peaceful assembly. Article 11 (1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights provides for the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly. Even if one moves away from these constitutionally 
protected rights one will still see that the requirement of peacefulness is 
essentially a requirement for a legal picket in most foreign jurisdictions. Section 
.1 
220 of the.British Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act of 1992 
provides for picketing which has the purpose of "peacefully obtaining or 
communicating information or peacefully persuading". Scottish law has a similar 
requirement81 . 
Section 17 of the Constitution provides for the right to picket without arms. I 
submit that section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 has to be 
interpreted in accordance with the objects, purport and spirit of the Bill of 
Rights82. Section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 only provides 
for a peaceful picket - no mention is made of being armed. I submit that the 
interpretation of the word peaceful in section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 should include being unarmed. Therefore, once picketers are armed 
then section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 is not complied with 
and the picket is not protected. 
Section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 does not provide for how a 
picket is to be conducted by the union or picketers. Landman83 maintains that the 
legislature's intention was to create the rules or conduct for a picket by agreement 
between the parties. One can infer that this is correct from the provisions of 
78 For a general outline of the right of assembly see Jayson Kraut American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition Vol. 
16A 1979 The Lawy~r Co-operative Publishing Co. at pages 415-426. 
79 The Canadian Constitution Act of 1982. 
80 The Gennan Constitution as reproduced in David P Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 1994 University of Chicago Press at page 343. 
81 Victor Craig Kenneth Miller Employment Law in Scotland 1st Edition 1991 T & T Clark at page 338. 
82 Section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
83 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (1996) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law page 43. 
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section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 itself. Section 69 ( 4) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for the CCMA, on application from the 
employer or a registered trade union, to attempt to get an agreement between the 
parties to a dispute on the rules to be applied to the picket. Failing an agreement 
section 69 ( 5) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for the fact that 
the CCMA must determine the rules which will apply to the picket taking into 
account various factors. Therefore, one can imply that if an agreement regarding 
the conduct of the picket exists between the registered trade union and the 
employer no recourse is needed to the CCMA. This agreement then is applicable 
to the conduct of the picket. As stated above, failing an agreement on the rules 
for the conduct of the picket being reached between the parties only a registered 
trade union or an employer can apply to the CCMA. This has constitutional 
implications in terms of the breach of section 9 of the Constitution as discussed 
under the heading "Persons who may stage a picket"84. In essence, we are 
concerned with a potential infringement of the right to equality. However, 
section 69 (4) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 does not really pose the 
same equality problems that section 69 ( l) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
poses in that, section 69 (4) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 presupposes 
that a picket will be proceeded with (all that has to be determined are the rules 
regulating the conduct of a picket), whereas section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations 
Act 66of1995 requires a registered trade union's authorisation to stage a picket 
in the first place. 
As said previously, ifthe parties to a dispute cannot agree on the rules relating to 
the conduct of the picket then the CCMA decides what these rules are to be. The 
CCMA is required by section 69 (5)(a) and (b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 to take into account two requirements i.e. a) the particular circumstances of 
the work-place and, b) any relevant code of good practice. This definition is not 
84 See page 12 of this dissertation.. 
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exhaustive and Landman85 gives a list of other factors which should be addressed 
in deciding on the rules. No code of good practice exists in relation to picketing 
at the moment. A Code of good practice exists in the United Kingdom86. This 
Code is in essence a restatement of the British law regulating pickets87 The 
relevant aspect of this Code in a South African context is that pickets are subject 
to the criminal law88. This has relevance to the discussion under the heading 
"The place where a picket is staged" ofthis dissertation where the phrase "despite 
any laws regulating the right of assembly"89 is discussed. The aforesaid Code 
limits the numbers of persons who are allowed on the picket line at any one time 
to six persons90 due to the reason that violence and disorder on the picket line are 
more likely to occur if there are excessive numbers91 . However, the limitation on 
the number of persons taking part in the picket does not have any significance to 
our law of picketing as section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 allows 
mass picketing in that section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 
refers to registered trade unions, members and their supporters. 
Section 69 ( 6) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for the fact that 
the CCMA may make a rule that the picket may be conducted on the premises of 
the employer if the employer's permission as contemplated in section 69 (2)(b) of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 has been unreasonably withheld. Section 69 
( 6) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 restricts the persons who may conduct 
a picket on the employer's premises to the employer's employees only. This is 
so despite the large contingent of persons mentioned in section 69 ( 1) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 who may conduct a picket. Section 69 ( 6) of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 has the possible effect of excluding section 
69' s application to a secondary picket. Section 69 ( 6) of the Labour Relations 
85 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (1996) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law page 43. 
86 Code of Practice .... Picketing (1992) as created and regulated by the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act of 1992 in terms of sections 199-208. 
87 Sections 218 to 221 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992. 
88 Section C paragraph 41-44 of the Code of Practice .. Picketing (1992). 
89 See page 14 of this dissertation. 
90 Paragraph 51 of the Code of Practice .. Picketing (1992). 
91 Paragraph 48-51 of the Code of Practice .. Picketing (1992). 
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Act 66 of 1995 encroaches upon the rights of the owner to the use and enjoyment 
of his land under the broader guise of ownership. Nevertheless, such an 
infringement could give rise to criminal prosecution by the mechanism of the 
Trespass Act92. Because of section 69 ( 6) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
it is submitted that it is highly unlikely that a Court would find a trespass in terms 
of section 69 ( 6) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 as being unlawful. 
Who determines whether the consent of the employer is unreasonably withheld in 
terms of section 69 (3) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 
69 (2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995? There is no express provision 
dealing with this question. After consideration, one can possibly refer the dispute 
(i.e. the question whether consent has been withheld unreasonably) to the CCMA 
for conciliation under section 69 (8)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 on 
the grounds that the effective use of the right to picket has been undermined. The 
rest of the sub-sections of section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 
do not seem to have application to this question although section 69 (8Xb) may 
have some relevance. section 69 (8)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 
requires that a dispute concerning a contravention of section 69 ( 1) or (2) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 be referred to the CCMA for conciliation. A 
dispute as required by section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 can 
arise in the context of section 69 (2Xb) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 by 
virtue of the question whether the employer has consented to the picketing inside 
his premises. It is submitted that section 69 (8)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 requires that the court must determine whether the required permission 
has been given or not. Hereby, the court is drawn into an artificial reasoning of 
having to declare that permission which has in fact not been given by the 
employer but which is unreasonably withheld by him is in fact permission given 
in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
92 Trespass Act 6of1959 ~see Professor Davis "Picketing" (1988) Vol. 9 No. 1 Industrial law Journal at 
page 35. 
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5.6 The resolution of disputes about picketing 
Section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 69 (10) of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 requires that disputes concerning matters 
mentioned in section 69 (8) (a) to (d) be referred to the CCMA. If the dispute 
cannot be settled by conciliation it is referred to the Labour Court for adjudication 
in terms of section 69 ( 11) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Section 69 
(8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 must be read with section 69 (9) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, which requires that a copy of the referral of the 
dispute must be served on all parties to the dispute. The term "parties" is not 
defined. However, with reference to the fact that only a registered trade union 
may authorise a picket93 and only an employer and registered trade union may 
apply to the CCMA.94 in an attempt to reach agreement on the rules for the 
conduct of the picket, it seems that the section 69 (8), (9) and (11) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 refer to the parties to the dispute as being a registered 
trade union and an employer. 
Some interesting questions arise in connection with the agreements relating to the 
conduct of a picket. As explained earlier section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 does not make provision for agreements concluded between the 
employer and union regarding the conduct of a strike without the intervention and 
aid of the CCMA (hereafter called a non CCMA agreement). Only agreements 
regulating the conduct of the picket concluded under the auspices of the CCMA 
are provided for in section 69 (4) and (5) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
Section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 likewise, makes no 
provision for the breach of an agreement other than the CCMA agreement. On a 
literal interpretation, this means that a breach of a non CCMA agreement cannot 
be referred to the CCMA and subsequently to the Labour Court for conciliation 
93 Section 69 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
94 Section 69 (4) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
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and adjudication respectively95. In the Lomati case96, Landman A.J. refused to 
accept this interpretation.97 The court accepted that section 69 (8) (c) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 did not literally include non CCMA 
agreement98. The court reasoned that the material part of section 69 (8) (c) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was that a "breach of an agreement"99 between 
the parties should be referred to the CCMA for conciliation. The court took a 
purposive approach and stated further that "an agreement mediated or brokered by 
some other agency other than the CCMA was neither here nor there''. 100 The 
decision can be supported to some extent by the fact that section 69 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 does not regulate the conduct of the picket but impliedly 
leaves such rules to be determined by the parties to the agreement101 . 
Nevertheless, if one looks at section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 one will see that it is clear and unambiguous. As such, there seems no 
juridical basis for extending the section to include agreements other than those 
concluded under the agency of the CCMA, even though such an interpretation 
could lead to the possible negation of non CCMA agreements. There seems to 
have been an omission on the part of the legislature in this regard. The ease with 
which this problem is overcome and explained in the Lomati case102 can possibly 
be explained on the basis that it was common cause between the parties to the 
dispute that section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 actually applied 
to a non CCMA agreement. I submit that in order to use the provisions of 
95 Section 69 (8), (9), (10) and (11) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
96 Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 lndustria/ Law Journal 178 (LC). 
97 Lomati Mill Barberton case (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 181E-G. 
98 Lomati Mill Barberton case (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 181ndustrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 181 E-G. 
99 Lomati Mill Barberton case (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Woad and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 181 E-G. 
100 Lomati Mill Barberton case (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and A/lied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 181ndustrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 181 atE-G. 
101 See the discussion hereof under the heading "The manner in which a picket is conducted" at page 18 of 
this dissertation. 
102 Lomati Mill Barberton case (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC). 
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section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995, with specific reference to 
non CCMA agreements, one would have to try and fit a dispute in this regard 
under section 69 (8) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 on the basis that 
the "effective use of the right to picket is being undermined". On this basis it can 
be argued that without any rules regulating the conduct of the picket, how can the 
right to picket ever be deemed to be effective. Such a view is more in line with 
our law of statutory interpretation 103 . 
A further issue raised in the Lomati decision104 was whether a dispute as referred 
to in section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 has to be conciliated 
first or whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine the dispute 
notwithstanding the fact that such conciliation has not taken place. section 69 
(10) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 is couched in peremptory language 
"must". This implies that in order for the Labour Court to have jurisdiction to 
determine the dispute under section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995, the dispute must be conciliated by the CCMA. Landman A.J. in the Lomati 
case
105 determined that the Labour Court can dispense with the requirement of 
conciliation by the CCMA in terms of section 157 ( 4) of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995. 106 The court points out the desirability of doing this in cases of 
urgency107. My submission in this regard is that section 157 (4) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66of1995 does not grant the Labour Court the power to simply 
ignore the requirement of section 69 (10) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
The Lomati decision ignores the function of the conciliation provisions under 
section 13 5 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Section 15 7 ( 1) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides that the Labour Court has exclusive 
103 See generally C. J. Botha Statutory Interpretation 200 Edition 1994 Juta and Co. 
104 Lomati Mill Barberton case (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 181 H-1. 
105 Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC). 
106LomatiMill Barberton case (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 181 H-1. 
107 Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division of Sappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) case at page 181 I. 
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jurisdiction over all matters which have to be determined by the Labour Court 
"except where this Act provides". Section 69 (10) of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 is a prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Jurisdiction 
by its nature is the first concept that a court looks at to determine a dispute which 
comes before it. Primarily, the court must have jurisdiction before it can condone 
non compliance with a provision or rule. An interpretation based on section 157 
(4) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 presupposes that the court has 
jurisdiction to determine a dispute but refuses to for various reasons. An 
interpretation that section 157 (4) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 gives 
the court the power to condone the fact that it does not have jurisdiction places the 
cart before the horse, so to speak. Juridically this is incorrect. Furthermore, one 
should bear in mind that section 157 (4)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 does not expressly say that a court can ignore the conciliation process. In 
the interest of practicality, it would seem desirable to allow the Labour Court to 
dispense with the requirement of conciliation in matters of urgency. However, 
this power has not been given to the Labour Court. 
5. 7 The legal protection afforded under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides, "the provisions 
of section 67 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, read with the changes 
required by the context, apply to the calling for, organisation of, or participation 
in a picket that complies with the provisions of this section." In essence this 
means replacing the words strike and lock-out, which appear in section 67 of the 
Labour Relations Act 66of1995, with the word "picket". This section means 
that a person does not commit a delict or breach of contract by calling for 
organising or taking part in a protected picket - section 69 (7) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 67 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995. A protected picket is one that complies with the requirements of section 
69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Section 69 (7) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 67 (6) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
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of 1995 drives home the impact of section 67 (2)(a) and (2)(b) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 by providing that no civil proceedings may be instituted 
against any person who calls for, organises, or participates in a protected picket or 
in any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected picket. 
Landman108 submits that this is to avoid tactical litigation and to ensure the 
protection afforded against civil liability. Therefore, section 69 (7) read with 
section 67 ( 6) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 prevents the procuring of 
interdicts. 
The question arises as to which persons are protected from civil liability. The 
d . b d . 109 L d 110 • h persons protecte are umon mem ers an its supporters . an man rruses t e 
question against whom are the aforesaid persons protected? Landman111 
submits that the protection against civil liability applies to "anyone" who would 
be harmed by the breach of contract or the commission of the deli ct. I agree with 
this sentiment as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 does not distinguish 
between primary and secondary picketing and as such does not limit picketing to 
an employer of the members of the union- it could apply to a supplier of the 
employer who employs the union members112. 
Section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 67 (8) of· 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for the limitation of the protection 
afforded by section 67 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 against civil 
liability. It provides that a person will not receive the immunity from civil 
liability if the act committed is an offence. The offence is a criminal offence in 
terms of statute or common law113. Section 67 (9) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
108 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (1996) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law at page 44. 
109 Section 69 (1) read with section 67 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
110 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (1996) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law at page 44. 
111 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (19%) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law at page 44. 
112 See the discussion under the heading "The employer who is affected by a picket" at page 11 of this 
dissertation. 
113 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (1996) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law at page 44; 
Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 184 D-E. 
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of 1995 provides that certain contraventions of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act114 and the Wage Act115 are not offences for the purposes of 
determining the protection afforded against civil liability. As explained earlier 
under the heading "The place where a picket is staged"116 the term "despite any 
law regulating the right of assembly" 117 should be interpreted in the context of 
providing that a breach of a law regulating the right to assembly will not be 
construed as an offence for the purposes of determining liability on a civil basis, 
provided it is in terms of section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
Generally, one can say that pickets are accompanied by the carrying of posters 
and the communicating of messages verbally. These communications can 
possibly be defamatory. Does the protection afforded under section 69 (7) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 read with section 67 of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 protect a picketer :from civil liability in the form of defamation? An 
answer to this is the fact that defamation is a criminal offence in South Africa. 
The protections envisaged under section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 read with section 67 of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 do not extend 
to situations involving the commission of a criminal offence. Therefore, where 
defamation is committed an aggrieved employer can institute a claim for damages 
based on delict. If it were not for the criminal sanctioning of defamation, a 
picketer could in principle have an absolute right to defame an employer in terms 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The idea of an absolute right to defame 
is not in accordance with the Constitution's Bill of Rights which are capable of 
being limited in terms of section 36118. However, if defamation was 
decriminalised, how would one handle this aspect of defamation? 
Referring to our discussion concerning the argument that a breach of an 
agreement relating to the rules for the conduct of the picket makes a picket 
114 Act 3of1983. 
115 Act 5of1957. 
116 See page 17 of this dissertation. 
117 Section 69 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
118 Section 7 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. 
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unprotected119 even though the requirements of section 69 of the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 have been complied with, provides a possible solution to limiting 
an absolute right to the defame. In principle one can agree with picketers as to 
the rules for the conduct of the picket. One could agree that the defamatory 
communications must not be made during the picket. A definition of what 
constitutes a defamatory statement could also be agreed upon. If the picketers 
breach this agreement by making defamatory statements, then the picket is 
unprotected and civil liability is no longer excluded. Upon adjudication by the 
court, defamatory statements can be balanced against the freedom of speech 
provisions in the Constitution 120. 
Section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 67 (4) of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides that an employee cannot be 
dismissed for participating in a protected picket or conduct in contemplation or in 
furtherance of a protected picket. However, section 67 (5) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides that an employer may fairly dismiss an 
employee, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 for reasons relating to the employee's conduct during the picket, or for a 
reason relating to the employer's operational requirements. 
Further remedies are provided under section 67 (3) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 read with section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. These 
provisions require that an employer is not obliged to remunerate an employee for 
services that the employee does not render during a protected picket. This is so, 
even though no breach of contract has taken place121 . The aforesaid is qualified 
in that if the employee's remuneration includes payment in kind in respect of 
accommodation, provision of food, and other basic amenities oflife, the employer 
119 See this aspect discussed under the heading "Miscellaneous Considerations" at page 31 of this 
dissertation. 
120 Section 36 read with section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. 
121 Section69 (7) read with section 67 of the Labour Relations Act66of1995. 
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cannot discontinue such payment during the length of the picket122. Section 67 
(3)(b) read with section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides 
that the monetary amount of such payment in kind may be recovered by way of 
civil proceedings in the Labour Court by the employer. 
One will recall that section 67 (6) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 read 
with section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 prevents civil 
proceedings in respect of the participation in a protected picket or in respect of 
any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected picket. Whether 
the civil proceedings in respect of the payment in kind refer to the civil 
proceedings as mentioned in section 67 ( 6) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 is a matter of some debate. Section 67 (3) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 specifically excludes the operation of section 67 (2) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 by the words "despite sub-section 2". However, why 
section 67 (6) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 was not expressly excluded 
is a mystery. If one accepts Landman's123 proposition that section 67 (6) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was enacted simply to avoid "tactical litigation", 
then it is submitted that one must interpret section 67 (3)(b) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 not to fall within the prohibition of section 67 ( 6) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66of1995 because section 67 (3)(b) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 creates a sui generis action not based on delict or breach 
of contract. 
The failure of a registered trade union or registered employer's organisation to 
comply with a provision requiring a ballot to be conducted of its members in 
respect of when it intends to call a picket may not give rise to or constitute a 
ground for any litigation that will affect the legality of and protection conferred by 
section 67 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 on the picket. 
122 Section 67 (3)(a) read with section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
123 Landman "The New Right to Picket" (19%) Vol. 6 No. 5 Contemporary Labour Law at page 44. 
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6. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. 
Is the picket still protected ifthe agreement regulating the rules for the conduct of 
the picket is breached? It can be argued that the picket is still protected on the 
basis that the agreement relating the conduct of the picket simply reinforces the 
already determined protected right to picket in terms of section 69 ( l) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and 69 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995. It can be argued that section 69 (4) and (5) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 simply expand upon a given or determined right. The breach of 
agreement may also overlap with the breach of section 69 (1) and (2) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66of1995. For example, a non peaceful picket. As such 
the picket will be unprotected, not because of the breach of the agreement but 
because of the b.reach of the requirements for a protected picket under section 69 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. If one accepts this construction, one 
must argue that section 69 (8), (9), ( 10) and ( 11) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995, and the determination of the dispute by the Labour Court in terms of 
section 69 ( 11) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is, in fact, not civil 
proceedings as mentioned in section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 read with section 67 (6) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. Any other 
interpretation in this regard would hi-light a conflict in the provision of section 69 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 i.e. section 69 (7) read with section 69 
(8), (9), (10), and (11 ). 
Secondly, and from another angle it can be argued that if an agreement regarding 
the rules for the conduct of the picket is breached and the picket remains 
protected, how can the court order compliance with the agreement ifthe picket is 
not subject to civil proceedings and liability under section 69 (7) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995. As such, section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 itself seem to imply that a breach of an agreement relating to the rules for 
the conduct of the picket makes the picket unprotected. How else does one 
explain a courts ability to determine a dispute under section 69 (8) of the Labour 
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Relations Act 66 of 1995 read with section 69 ( 11) of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 given section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The mere 
fact that a court can order compliance with an agreement regulating the rules for 
the conduct of a picket as the court did in the Lomati case124 in fact, implies that 
the picket was unprotected. This approach requires that compliance with the 
agreement regulating the rules for the conduct of the picket is another requirement 
for a protected picket. 
The second construction as aforesaid is in line with the fact that the remedy for 
the enforcement of the breach of a section 69 (4) or (5}125 agreement is section 69 
(8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. However, as explained earlier, 
section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 does not refer to an 
agreement (non CCMA agreement) entered into except under the auspices of the 
CCMA. If the breach of a non CCMA agreement still left the picket protected, 
then no legal proceedings can be conducted in terms of section 69 (7) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 to enforce it at common law. Therefore, it is 
submitted that the observance of an agreement regulating the conduct of the 
picket, whether a CCMA agreement or non CCMA agreement, is a requirement 
for a protected picket under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
Hence, a breach of any agreement regulating picketing in fact makes the picket 
unprotected. One might ask how the observance of an agreement other than a 
CCMA agreement can be a requirement for a protected picket in view of the fact 
that section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 does not expressly refer to 
such an agreement and section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 also 
does not provide for disputes in this regard to be settled by the CCMA. As 
explained earlier126 a non CCMA agreement is implied into section 69 of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, albeit not in terms of section 69 (8) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
124 Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 181ndustrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 180 D·F, 181 J, 182 A·B. 
125 The Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
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The importance of determining the above point lies in the fact that the answer 
determines whether the Labour Court or the Supreme Court can enforce a breach 
of a non CCMA agreement relating to picketing at common law. Essentially, the 
decision in the Lomati case127 advocates upholding common law agreements 
relating to picketing. By the court ordering compliance with the non CCMA 
agreement, albeit in terms of section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995, the court impliedly acknowledges that the breach of an agreement 
regulating picketing, in fact, makes the picket unprotected. 
If the picket is unprotected there are a number of remedies available. Because the 
provisions of section 69 (7) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 do not apply 
to an unprotected picket (a picket which does not comply with the requirements of 
section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995), the injured party can bring an 
interdict or a claim based on contract or delict. The other mechanism is that the 
Labour Court can be approached under the procedure of section 69 (8) of the 
Labour Relations Act 66of1995 read with section 69 (11) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66of1995128 where the dispute arises over an alleged contravention 
of section 69 ( 1) and (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 or a breach of the 
rules for the conduct of the picket determined under the auspices of the CCMA. 
Here the Labour Court adjudicates this dispute. 
Section 15 8 (I )G) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for the Labour 
Court to deal with all matters necessary and incidental to performing its functions 
in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 or any other law. Section 157 
( 1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Labour Court in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of the Labour 
126 See the discussion under the heading "The manner in which a picket is conducted" at page 18 of this 
dissertation. 
127 Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18/ndustrial LawJouma/178 (LC) at page 182 A. 
128 PAK Le Roux "The Labour Court : some early decisions" (1997) Vol. 6 No. 8 Contemporary Labour 
Law at page 77. 
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Relations Act 66 of 1995 or in terms of any other law are to be determined by the 
Labour Court. Section 151 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 also 
provides that the Labour Court is a Supreme Court equal to a division of the 
Supreme Court. The question in need of ascertainment is whether the Labour 
Court can decide whether a breach of contract has occurred or whether a delict has 
been committed in relation to a picket. Furthermore, can the Labour Court grant 
interdicts to prevent criminal and other riotous conduct during a picket or do these 
disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? What is clear is that 
the Mondi decision 129 amounts to the following:- Where the act falls under the 
definition of picketing or, is a matter necessary and incidental to the performance 
of the Labour Court's functions in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995, 
or where the act concerns itself with any other law relating to picketing, the 
Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the issue130. Although the 
decision in Mondi31 dealt with the Labour Court having exclusive jurisdiction to 
grant an interdict preventing criminal and delictual conduct there seems to be no 
reason why a breach of an agreement, e.g. a non CCMA agreement which cannot 
be adjudicated by the Labour Court under section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 read with section 69 ( 11) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 
cannot be adjudicated by the Labour Court. Furthermore, if criminal and 
delictual conduct can be interdicted, then there is no reason why such conduct 
amounting to a delict cannot be adjudicated by the Labour Court, provided it 
relates to a picket. Landman AJ in the Lomati case132 explains it as follows, "if a 
broad and purposive view is taken of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the 
jurisdiction conferred on this Court [the Labour Court] then it is apparent that this 
court has jurisdiction over all strikes and lock-outs and conduct in contemplation 
or in furtherance of that action". This issue concerning competing jurisdictions 
129 Mondi Paper (a Division of Mondi Ltd) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union and others 
(1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 84 (D) at page 90 B-D. 
130Mondi Paper (a Division of Mondi Ltd) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union and others 
(1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 84 (D) at page 90 B-D. 
131 Mondi Paper (a Division of Mondi Ltd) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union and others 
(1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 84 (D) at page 90 B-I. 
132 Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 184 E-G. 
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of the Supreme Court and the Labour Court will have to be determined by the 
courts. Possibly, it may be found that the Labour Court and the Supreme Court 
have equal jurisdiction in regard to determining breaches of contract and delicts133 
flowing from picketing activity. As Nicholson J. intimated in the Mondi case, 
" ........ the onus to show that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction has been ousted is 
indeed a heavy onus" 134. 
7. CONCLUSION 
From the aforegoing discussion one can deduce that section 69 of Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 suffers from uncertainty and vagueness. One cannot 
but foresee that a large amount of technical and unnecessary litigation potentially 
exists as a result of this provision - primarily this is an interpretation problem. 
Landman AJ, in the Lomati case135, set the ball rolling, so to speak, and made 
quite an extensive decision even though a large part thereof is subject to 
argument. It is submitted, that section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
should be tackled by the Labour Court with vigour so as to set the interpretations 
to be attached to the various sub-sections of section 69 of the Labour Relations 
Act 66of1995. 
Section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 appears to have a number of 
provisions which conflict with the Constitution. As section 1 (a) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 specifically mentions one of the primary objects of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 as giving effect to fundamental rights, one 
would have thought that these pitfalls would have been avoided. Nevertheless 
the provisions of section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 are a 
limitation on the Constitutional right to picket in terms of section 17 of the 
133Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC) at page 184 E-G. 
134 Mondi Paper (a Division of Mondi Ltd) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union and others 
(1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 84 (D) at page 87 A-B. 
135 Lomati Mill Barberton (a Division ofSappi Timber Industries) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union and others (1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 178 (LC). 
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Constitution and as such will endure the court's scrutiny in deciding whether they 
are justifiable or not in terms of section 3 6 of the Constitution. 
Section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is a marked improvement on 
the common law in the sense that the right to picket is now expressly recognised 
and regulated. The law has unveiled a measure of certainty in this regard. 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 suffers from the problem that one its 
uncertain which court/courts have jurisdiction to hear certain matters particularly 
in view of the fact that the Labour Court is a Supreme Court. Even though the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 has an exclusive jurisdiction clause, it still has to 
be interpreted. This can cause problems which can be seen from the Mondi136 
decision. 
Section 69 (8) of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995 does not refer to a non 
CCMA agreement relating to the rules for the conduct of the picket. It is 
submitted that this is a shortcoming in the provision and an oversight on the 
legislature's behalf 
Section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 allows the rules for the 
conduct of the picket to be determined by agreement between the parties or under 
the auspices of the CCMA. However, this assumes that one has a situation where 
the parties are willing to agree on the rules for the conduct of the picket. In a 
situation where both parties are obstinate and refuse to agree to rules for the 
conduct of the picket and both parties refuse to refer the dispute in this regard to 
the CCMA for its determination, one can have a situation where a picket is 
protected under section 69 but no rules for its copduct exists. Where the CCMA 
attempts to get the parties to agree on rules for the conduct of the picket or where 
the CCMA determine the rules for the conduct of the picket, which will apply to 
136 Mondi Paper (a Division of Mondi Ltd) vs Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union and others 
(1997) 18 Industrial Law Journal 84 (D). 
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that picket, one assumes that one has an effective and efficient CCMA 
infrastructure in place. This remains to be seen. 
It is submitted that section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is framed in 
a skeletal fashion and that a large amount of the 'meat' still has to be added. 
From its structure one must assume that the drafters of this provision had in mind 
that picketing would take place primarily by agreement between the parties. 
Realistically, this does not take into account the often deeply dividing chasms 
between employers and employees. 
The concepts of secondary picketing are mass picketing are not expressly dealt 
with in terms of section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. It is 
submitted that both are permitted in terms of section 69 of the Labour Relations 
Act 66of1995137. 
137 See under the heading, "The employer who is affected by a picket" at page 11 of this dissertation. See 
under the heading, "Persons who may stage a picket" at page 12 of this dissertation. 
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